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Hypotheticals and Discussion Following the Remarks of
Mr. Jonathan Fried and Mr. Arthur Downey
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: There are two areas where we have a
potential for conflict: in the reexport regime and in the notion of tech
data. We will come back to this in more detail. But, while it is fresh in
your mind, note that Jon Fried discussed technical data or technology in
material form from the Canadian side. From the U.S. perspective, that is
an incomplete definition. That is, technical data or technology has an
extremely broad set of definitions. It involves anything that relates to
process, know-how, or ideas. It does not have to be in material form.
Therefore, technical data or technology is one area where the two sys-
tems don't meet. The Canadian side controls technology in material
form, whereas the U.S. side goes well beyond that. There is a gap be-
tween these two.
As far as reexport authorities are concerned, the United States be-
gins with a very broad assertion of authority, jurisdiction, and control.
Accordingly, the U.S. foresees that it has the authority to control all U.S.
origin products and technology no matter where they are and no matter
when they left the United States. No person, regardless of his national-
ity, may reexport any U.S. origin goods or technology without U.S. reex-
port authorization. It is a very broad area, again, where the two systems
don't mesh properly.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: Let us begin with an example of an export
of goods from the United States to Canada and the Canadian consignee,
as he is called in the American language, then decides to reexport that
product to a third country where the good involved is national security
controlled. It is a COCOM agreed item.
ANSWER, Mr. Downey: From the Canadian side, I think that the
Canadian exporter would be required to have a permit. From the U.S.
side, incredibly, that Canadian is also required to have a U.S. reexport
authorization because it is a U.S. product in Canada and it's being reex-
ported. It went to Canada without a license (presumably) because of the
Canadian exception. That exception applies only if the product is to be
used in Canada. If it is exported from Canada, it needs reexport authori-
zation, despite the fact that the Canadian permit will be issued based on
the Canadian Government's understanding with the United States.
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: What we are really talking about is extrater-
ritoriality-sometimes defined as the application of one country's laws
outside of its own territory. We, in Canada, are coming to define it as the
application of the United States' law outside the United States.
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QUESTION, Mr. Norris: Is it the original exporter to Canada, or
the Canadian reexporter that needs that permit?
ANSWER, Mr. Downey: The U.S. law refers to "no person...." It
doesn't say "no U.S. person," but no person may reexport.
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: Furthermore, that applies whether the per-
son is in the United States or in a foreign country.
ANSWER, Mr. Downey: It is the Canadian who has the obligation
to seek reexport authorization. If the original exporter to Canada is a
U.S. exporter who has knowledge at the time of his export that his Cana-
dian consignee is going to, in turn, reexport, then he can not avail himself
of the Canadian exception. Depending on the product, he will have to
get a license to ship to Canada and that license will have to show that the
ultimate destination of the product is not Canada, but someplace else.
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: The example we have used is one of a na-
tional security controlled item. That means it appears on the Canadian
Export Control List. We are going to control it not by virtue of it being a
U.S. origin good, but because it is a COCOM-agreed controlled item. It
is captured by us. Why the United States should need the additional
protection is beyond certain people's understanding.
Let's just vary the example ever so slightly. Let's say it is not a
national security controlled item. It does not appear on the COCOM
list, but is controlled by the United States for foreign policy reasons.
ANSWER, Mr. Downey: Under that circumstance, the same regime
holds from the U.S. perspective. Depending on the product, you need a
license to reexport. Our system is not so easily understood that you can
either look (as Jon Fried said before) to a product list or to an area list
and know the result. In the U.S. system, one must get very specific and
look at the confluent of the product and the destination. Generally
speaking, however, if that product that is now in Canada could have been
exported from the U.S. to the ultimate destination (to the third country)
under a general license, then the Canadian does not need reexport au-
thorization. Aside from that exception, he does.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: There again, Canada feels that it has per-
fectly adequate protection. Even if it doesn't appear elsewhere in the
Export Control List, it's covered by Item 9001 by virtue of being a U.S.
origin good. The Canadian exporter would still be obliged to get a per-
mit because it is a U.S. origin good that has not been substantially
changed in substance, form, or use; furthermore, it has not been further
processed or manufactured so as to become a new product.
As a matter of Canadian law, our officials regularly check and main-
tain a clear, open channel of communication with U.S. authorities. Thus,
in our administration of ministerial discretion, we are not going to grant
a permit for a U.S. origin good that is unchanged in circumstances and
where the United States would not have granted a license in the first
place.
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A third example is if the good was destined for a destination con-
trolled by one of the U.S. asset control regulations.
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: An example of such a destination would
be Cuba or North Korea. In that circumstance, there is an absolutely
clear requirement from the U.S. side that the product may not be reex-
ported to Cuba, Cambodia, North Korea, or Vietnam. If one seeks reex-
port authorization, it will be denied. An exception exists with Cuba
where the U.S. product is incorporated into a Canadian product; how-
ever, this circumstance is not in our problem. In that circumstance, if
the U.S. part constituted less than 20% by value of the Canadian prod-
uct, a license could be granted. Otherwise, it could not.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: Let's just present other examples involving
U.S. origin goods before we get into further manufacturing or processing.
For our example, let's use a service industry that overhauls aircraft en-
gines or repairs computers and does business both in Canada and in the
United States, as well as in third countries. This industry does some
stockpiling, warehousing, and inventorying of goods, and spare parts, as
well. Furthermore, the Canadian company in this kind of business im-
ports some of these U.S. origin goods to put on the shelf. At the time of
its import into Canada, this company doesn't know whether it is going to
be for end use in Canada or whether in six months time it is going to be
put into a product for destination to a third country. This presents a
stockpiling or warehousing situation where the Canadian importer has
no knowledge and it is impossible for this importer, at the time of export
from the United States into Canada, to know where the goods are
destined.
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: In that kind of a circumstance, a very
murky area arises from the United States perspective. The United States
regulations put no affirmative obligation on the American exporter to
make an inquiry of this Canadian consignee as to what he would be do-
ing with the goods. However, if the American has knowledge or a reason
to know that the product is not going to stay in Canada, then he cannot
avail himself of the exception and would be required to obtain a license
for the shipment to Canada, with all of the accompanying restrictions.
There is a lesser standard, a "reason to believe," which could apply to
the exporter if he subsequently learns or has information that would lead
a reasonably prudent person to believe that the product is going to move
out of Canada. In that circumstance he has to notify the U.S. govern-
ment of a change in material fact.
To summarize, when the American exporter exports to Canada, it is
with the reasonable belief that the product is going to stay in Canada. If
he later learns that it's not, but instead is being reexported, then he has to
report this fact. Therefore, there is no duty to inquire affirmatively; but if
the U.S. exporter knows the product is going to be reexported, he then
has an obligation to notify the U.S. government.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: Of course, from a Canadian perspective,
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the same principle should apply, which is that U.S. law should not apply.
If it is a strategic good, it is going to be controlled from Canada as a
matter of Canadian law under the Export Control List or the Area Con-
trol List. If it is unchanged and remains a U.S. origin good, it is going to
be controlled under Item 9001, in any event, in a manner consistent with
U.S. principles. Again, there is no necessity, as far as we are concerned,
for any U.S. reexport licensing at all.
COMMENT, Mr. Wright: I don't understand why you keep talking
about the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. It seems to me this is
the application of U.S. law to goods that are in the United States at the
time that the deal is made. And if we Canadians want to take the goods
knowing that that is the rule, then we should govern ourselves accord-
ingly. If we don't want to be bound by the rule and we are going to jump
up and down and talk about extraterritorial application of law, we don't
have to buy the goods. We can either make them ourselves or buy them
somewhere else.
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: And the loser is the United States
exporter.
COMMENT, Mr. Wright: I don't understand this.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: Let me draw a distinction between a
through shipment or stream of commerce transaction and other transac-
tions. In the through shipment, the Canadian is the middleman who
knows even before procuring the export from the United States that it is
going on to a third country. However, in the other transactions, particu-
larly the warehousing situation, the only transfer of goods at the time is a
sale from the United States to Canada which the Canadian intends to put
on the shelf.
In the first situation, where you know before the goods ever leave
the United States that they are destined to a third country, Canada does
recognize the right of the United States to control the ultimate destina-
tion of the goods by requiring the Canadian to get a U.S. export permit.
This was at issue in a U.S. investigation involving a fellow named Leslie
Kline. He was prosecuted in the United States for alleged transship-
ments through Canada. He claimed this was an improper assertion of
American authority. The Canadian government denied that it was an
improper prosecution based on the facts alleged because at the time of his
original transaction, when he tried to get computers out of New Hamp-
shire to Montreal, he knew where they were going.
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: This is a true transshipment situation:
the product goes from New Hampshire right to the Montreal airport for
movement to Prague.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: As opposed to that, if the transaction was
only from the United States to Canada, we go back to more general prin-
ciples of jurisdiction based on international law. A state exercises its au-
thority clearly over its own territory.
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In certain limited circumstances, a state may exercise some author-
ity over its nationals. The United States taxes its citizens wherever they
are in the world. We control passports wherever they are in the world.
That is jurisdiction based on nationality. No country, however, recog-
nizes jurisdiction based on nationality of goods.
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: Nobody, except the United States.
There may be others, and someone could find certain other countries that
would be prepared to assert that. I suspect the United Kingdom would
have been prepared to assert that in the Falkland crisis where supreme
national interests were at stake.
COMMENT, Mr. Wright: We would have asserted the same thing,
too, if the situation were reversed and we had 200 million people turning
out all of this stuff and the Americans wanted it.
QUESTION, Mr. Fried: We point out to the Americans that con-
tracts between private parties cannot either oust or grant jurisdiction to
governments inconsistent with the primacy of territorial authority. In a
reverse example, would the United States ever accept France (through
Renault owning most of American Motors) purporting to tell American
Motors that they couldn't sell Jeeps to El Salvador?
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: See how clever he is? He shifted the
basis. Your example related to an original U.S, ownership of the goods
and the U.S. attached strings on the goods; if the goods moved to Can-
ada, those strings would still be there. That is a legitimate basis. If you
don't want those goods with those strings, don't buy them. If you buy
them, you know those strings are there. Mr. Fried shifted immediately
into a transactional basis situation where the controls are based on own-
ership of the foreign corporation, which is not what we are talking about.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: Before we go any further, I would like to
put one or two other examples on the table just to give you a better feel
for the reach of U.S. authority.
We have talked about U.S. origin goods. The other reason for our
objection to U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction is that it vio-
lates our bilateral understandings going back to 1941. The recognition
was there that U.S. controls would not be applied and was later formal-
ized in a series of agreements which provided that Canada would apply
the controls for the U.S.
We have also talked about the warehouse situation. Now let's talk
about a Canadian product, a totally Canadian product produced through
an industrial process of U.S. design. In other words, a Canadian product
of U.S. technology.
ANSWER, Mr. Downey: From the U.S. viewpoint, the transfer to
Canada of the know-how, or the tech data, originally required no license
(with certain exceptions, such as that of extremely sensitive nuclear ma-
terial). No license is required to move that technology to Canada for use
in Canada.
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To reexport the know-how would require an authorization because
it went license-free to Canada only. The U.S. has certain controls on the
direct product of that know-how if the direct product is going to certain
countries, principally the East Bloc countries. Those products are of the
type that would have required an individual license from the United
States if they were shipped from the United States. The logic of it is: if
the U.S. would have required a license for the products to be sold to
Czechoslovakia, and the U.S. is supplying Canada with the know-how to
makes these products, the U.S. in turn, wants the authority to double-
check the control which Canada has over those same products being sold
to Czchoslovakia. Maybe the Canadian system doesn't work in all cir-
cumstances and the U.S. wants the authority to get that person who is
violating its controls.
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: From a Canadian perspective, you have a
Canadian company engaged in Canadian manufacturing or production in
Canada producing Canadian goods. How American law can reach a Ca-
nadian firm producing a Canadian product, again, would appear to vio-
late virtually every internationally agreed principle of jurisdiction.
We would add that our system of controls for strategic goods that
are sensitive and important is in multilateral agreement, based on
COCOM, and is in full conformity with the wishes of the United States
and other countries with regard to strategic goods. In practice, depend-
ing on what Mr. Downey might have to say about current enforcement
and investigative attitudes in the United States, the difficult area concerns
a foreign policy controlled destination. If it is a strategic good or a
COCOM prescribed destination, whether Canadian law or U.S. law is
the tool by which that export is controlled, the end result is the same.
Neither country is going to allow the export. We, of course, prefer and
strongly insist that the export be done as a matter of Canadian law.
When the destination is Cuba or other foreign policy controlled des-
tinations, our philosophies may, and sometimes do, diverge.
QUESTION, Mr. Allen: There seems to be a lot of chat here about
goods from the U.S. to Canada and from Canada onward. It may come
as a bit of a surprise to some people, but goods do go from Canada to the
U.S., and then beyond. I would have the impression that the Canadian
government does not require its permission in those reexports.
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: We expect the United States, in controlling
the reexport from the United States, to do so in a manner that was in
conformity with Canadian policy.
Take for example, a military good that a Canadian firm sells to the
United States and then the American importer wants to ship the good on
to Taiwan. The United States might permit the export. We would not
have permitted the direct export. We would expect the United States to
deny that reexport on the basis of Canadian policy.
QUESTION, Mr. Allen: But then let me take this example one
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point further. Would anyone care to speculate on what the U.S. attitude
might be if Canada insisted in those circumstances that a permit also be
obtained from Canada?
QUESTION, Mr. Downey: Are you raising circumstance where
there is a product of Canadian origin that is unchanged and unincorpo-
rated in the United States?
ANSWER, Mr. Allen: Yes, let's say, the product has a Canadian
content of more than 20%.
ANSWER, Mr. Downey: You have a Canadian product that comes
to the United States and it is to be exported to Zambia. I think the
United States government probably wouldn't care if the Canadian gov-
ernment wanted to assert an authority over that, though I suspect Jon
Fried will say that I am wrong.
The United States government is going to assert an authority over
that product because it is a product leaving the U.S. and, therefore,
should be controlled by the United States. It is not of U.S. origin, but it
is leaving the United States; and if the Canadian government also wants
to control the product, that should be fine with the U.S.
In fact, there was a classic case some years ago when Control Data
Corporation (CDC) in the U.S. wanted to show the American govern-
ment how antiquated its policies were on controls of products exported
to Eastern Europe. CDC bought an advanced East German computer, a
copy of an IBM model, and brought it into the United States for review
and inspection. When CDC was shipping it back to its facility in Vienna,
the U.S. government said that the export needed a license. It was of East
German origin, but it was being exported from the U.S. This illustrates
that the U.S. will control all its exports. If the government of Canada
wishes to control the same, I don't think the U.S. would say no. On the
other hand, I think the U.S. would, as a practical matter, get very upset if
there was no U.S. control and a foreign government was trying to tell us
what to do within the United States.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: That again, comes to the foreign policy
example.
ANSWER, Mr. Downey: Yes, I agree that this is the foreign policy,
transaction-based ownership-based problem. Yes, the U.S. would be-
come unhappy if the government of France told American Motors that it
should not supply jeeps to X country and the United Auto Workers lost
all of those jobs; the U.S. would get very upset.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: Let me add one additional aspect. I did
mention that the minister has complete discretion in issuing permits.
That includes attaching such conditions that he sees fit. The minister in
Canada may, if you are shipping through the United States to another
country, specify reexport conditions. Those conditions would only attach
to you, the Canadian exporter. We would never assert direct jurisdiction
over the U.S. consignee by virtue of either the contractual undertaking or
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the request for you to pass it on to your American consignee. There, the
Americans differ from us again: the Canadian importer would accept or
recognize that the U.S. purports to control the reexport. The U.S. claims
the authority to directly prosecute the Canadian importer, who may
never have had any presence in the United States.
COMMENT, Mr. Morrison: Part of what you are talking about
seems to be a question more of symmetry than of extraterritoriality.
There seems to be a broad agreement that these issues will be dealt with
cooperatively and that the controls will be effectively maintained by the
two governments. Once you reach that extent of the agreement, I think
you are pretty well agreed, in substance, that cooperatively this will be
worked out. Your focus seems to be on the practical means by which
that agreement will be implemented.
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: Yes and no. We might focus this discussion
more on the foreign policy area. We certainly agree on strategic goods
and technology and that does boil down to modalities of implementing a
common system.
Regarding foreign policy-based controls, let's take Cuba, for exam-
ple. Canada has never broken diplomatic relations with Cuba and doesn't
have any legislation directing corporations to trade with Cuba, but it en-
courages, through our trade commissioners and otherwise, a healthy
trade in civilian goods with Cuba.
However, we don't sell strategic goods to Cuba, even though it's not
on the COCOM list or on our Area Control List. We know that they are
an adversary and we are not going to sell them guns. We will sell them
butter, though. The Americans, on the other hand, under their Cuban
Asset Control Regulations, will not.
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: The U.S. will say nothing goes to Cuba
from the United States, as you well know. Not even butter or light bulbs.
It is an absolute embargo.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: This brings us to the example of U.S. com-
ponents further manufactured or processed in Canada. Let's take U.S.
glass or U.S. tungsten going into a Canadian light bulb. As far as we're
concerned, based on value, further processing, severability, and percent-
age content, that light bulb is a Canadian good. Item 9001 doesn't even
enter into it. If that light bulb doesn't appear on the Export Control List,
and most likely it doesn't, it is because there is nothing strategic about a
light bulb and it is going to a destination that is not on our Area Control
List. Canadian export control law and policy governs. For the Canadian
light bulb exporter, therefore, if there is no prohibition in the Export
Control List and no mention of Cuba in the Area Control List, you don't
need a permit. The Canadian company can sell that light bulb to Cuba.
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: From the U.S. side, the situation is dif-
ferent. I will also bring out the Libyian situation to show that the U.S.
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made some strides forward in recognition of the sensitivities of very sen-
sitive people.
In our Cuba circumstance, the United States had taken the view
that it maintains an absolute embargo and does not want any part of the
industrial basis of the United States to be used to benefit Cuba. If we are
going to sell light bulb glass to Canada, that's fine. We love Canadians;
let them have all of the light bulb glass they want. But if they are going
to use that American light bulb glass and send it to Cuba, that defeats
our goal and, therefore, we will say, "No, it cannot go."
However, we will say, as an exception, that if the foreign govern-
ment, Canada in this case, has a policy encouraging trade with Cuba, and
if that decision is one independent from the U.S. (i.e., if it's not really run
by the United States company involved), then it's a Canadian decision
which is okay. And if there is no U.S. financing or U.S. guarantees, then
that's fine; the U.S. owned or controlled entity in Canada can engage in
trade with Cuba in those narrow circumstances.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: It can engage in trade with Cuba only if it
applies for and gets a U.S. license to do so.
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: If its U.S. parent applies for the license
and gets one, it can even use U.S. parts. It's okay to use that glass in
your trade with Cuba, as long as it's insignificant which is defined to
mean less than 20%.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: But for an aircraft to Libya, it can also be
defined as 1%.
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: A lot of people would say that is an
overreach on transaction controls - that is, owner control based and not
product based. In this recent activity with Nicaragua and with Libya,
the U.S. has advanced (or declined, depending on your viewpoint) and
takes the position: if you, United States company, supply a company in
Canada or elsewhere with a product, part, or component; and it has be-
come substantially transformed in Canada, Italy, or elsewhere; then it's
beyond our control and you can reexport the product to Libya or wher-
ever. That's the current law.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: Just one other point before any further
questions. We do recognize the progress made by the United States in
the Nicaraguan and the Libyian sanctions. They have, in fact, learned
the lesson of the Siberian pipeline and have circumscribed their controls.
In effect, these regulations still reflect the basic U.S. philosophy. What
the U.S. has done in the Nicaraguan and Libian sanctions is to say that
they exempt all transactions involving U.S. goods that are substantially
transformed, borrowing the Canadian definition. The conflict over the
Siberian pipeline has had an impact, at least, on the good people in the
State Department who influence the Treasury Department and the Na-
tional Security Council.
QUESTION, Mr. Jackson: When I spoke yesterday, I was faced
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with an interesting cultural difference question which I was only too
happy to answer. Now, I would like to bring up a question, one for each
of you.
In a country which is so dedicated to free enterprise and limited
government interference in business, is there any chance that this kind of
behavior in the world will gradually yield to the needs of business as an
international activity? Shouldn't Canada do all that it can to avoid get-
ting into the position of having such mercantilist controls over its busi-
ness when business has the ability to prevail in the world arena without a
lot of controls?
ANSWER, Mr. Downey: It is true that the American business com-
munity has felt aggrieved by the sudden imposition of foreign policy
based controls. These have hurt its business and there has been a great
deal of harm. The response from the public sector, that is, from Con-
gress or the Administration, is that you people in the business commu-
nity just want your dollars and you forget about the broad national
interests which you don't understand as well as we do.
The elected representatives of the people of the United States made
those decisions. The result, and I'm being facetious, of this conflict
presented itself last summer in the renewal of our Export Administration
Act. Included in this Act is a provision on contract "sanctity." This is a
very holy pontifical way of saying to the president, "For foreign policy
reasons, you can't impose a control over our exports unless there is a
'breach of peace' .... "Breach of peace" - a beautiful term because it is
undefined and no one knows what it means.
ANSWER, Mr. Fried: Sort of like a national emergency. The short
answer on the Canadian side, is that we, too, are trying to strike a similar
balance. In effect, right now we are tighter on nonstrategic goods to the
East Bloc than anybody else because, in fact, by virtue of having the Area
Control List, exports of light bulbs to the Soviet Union require an export
permit.
Shortly, Canada should be eliminating its Area Control List and
should then be in closer conformity with the U.S. system. The result will
be that, if the good is strategic, the Export Control List will cover it. If
the good is nonstrategic, why should the additional administrative bur-
den be imposed on our exporters?
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: Let's talk about the export of technical
data, blueprints, designs, and electronic transmission of information.
Those flow all the time between Canada and the United States-by mail,
telephone, telex, or any other form. Morever, technical data, itself, goes
on to a third country. Let me give the Canadian perspective first because
it is easy. First of all, item 10003 states that technical data is not con-
trolled unless it's in material form-something tangible and in your
hand. Secondly, that data must relate to something that's tangible and
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controlled elsewhere on our list. It either must be strategic and appear in
groups numbered three to eight, or be of U.S. origin, group nine.
If it is the direct manufactured product of technical data, the prod-
uct may be controlled, but not the data, itself. If it's not of U.S. origin
and not strategic, it is not otherwise controlled. We do not have, in the
legislation or the regulations, any specific exemption for mailing your
patent application to Europe. As a matter of administrative practice,
however, unless it's a strategic good, such as a design for a munitions
item, we are not going to purport to control it, even though the legisla-
tion preserves that right.
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: From the U.S. side, we wrap our arms
around everything and say that an idea, process, and know-how are all
tech data and we can control the export of that tech data. How do you
export it? You can export it by putting it in a blueprint and mailing it
out. You can export it by talking to the East German by telephone. You
can export it by having the East German come to your plant and look at
your process, et cetera. And you need a license for any export of tech
data.
QUESTION, Mr. Fried: Do you mean that you need a license to
have somebody visit your plant in the United States?
ANSWER, Mr. Downey: Yes, except if the data is generally avail-
able. Obviously if it's in a book in the library, no license is needed. Fur-
thermore, if it is scientific, educational, or if it's a patent application in
accordance with that system no license is needed. All other data not
generally available requires a license, except for Canada. If a Canadian
company puts on an in-house seminar conveying tech data and an East
German representative is present, and, further, an American attends and
gives a lecture of unclassified information which the East German hears,
a U.S. license would be required. Here, again, the U.S. has a different set
of systems.
Comparatively, the Canadian Government controls access at the
border. If the Government allows the Russian or the East German in,
either can hear whatever he wants. On the American side, however, the
U.S. lets either one in, but then places earmuffs on him.
QUESTION, Mr. Roseman: I wanted to ask another question relat-
ing to services. Say, for example, Saudi Arabia is trying to upgrade its
telephone systems as the key to military communications. They are able
to get the technology of the French, the Swedish, or whatever. They may
have stolen it or perhaps the Saudis bought it; but in order to put it
together and make it work, they ask Bell Canada to put together the
system, manage it, and provide the management and know-how. Is that
kind of thing restricted?
ANSWER, Mr. Downey: It is not restricted by the United States, if
it is Canadian knowledge. If it is U.S. know-how that went to Canada
and it's going to be applied to the Soviet Union, then, under most cir-
11
: Hypotheticals and Discussion Following the Remarks of Mr. Jonatha
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1986
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
cumstances reexport authorization from the United States would be
required.
COMMENT, Mr. Bradley: This last part was one of the things that
I was hoping would come up, but it still implies that these U.S. controls
have something to do with strategic goods and I would argue that in-
creasingly, it is a matter of technological protectionism: a set of nontariff
barriers that are economically based.
You can fit almost anything into the military critical technologies
list these days. Processes used to create this paper that I'm writing on
could be controlled. We have got a situation now arising where there are
controls on unclassified technical data. It's not controls to the East
Germans. It's controls to Canadian access or West German access.
DOD is now proposing rules on access to scientific meetings on DOD
funded research. DOD is one of the largest, if not the largest, funder of
research. In fact, I'm told that it is the largest funder of basic physics
and basic mathematics research in Canada. You are controlling scientific
needs which have historically not been intellectual property questions,
not questions of security of classification, and yet they are now being
controlled. I argue that those are increasingly motivated by economic
protectionist attitudes, both in DOD and in Congress, and that it is part
of a pending technology war between Europe, Japan and the U.S.; but
you are using the strategic excuse.
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: I think that's wrong, but you have a
core that is correct. Obviously there are a lot of people in the United
States who want to protect U.S. technology from everybody, including
the Canadians, and use all devices accordingly; however, scientific infor-
mation and educational information are not controlled for export.
There are circumstances where in company financed or government
financed projects, even if unclassified, an attempt is made to add restric-
tions. I think that's unwise as a U.S. national policy, but I don't think
you can say fairly that this export control system and law have been
designed for an economic security base, since it has been there for a long
time and has been fundamentally unchanged. The other thing that you
are talking about is contract research being more limited. I think you are
right, but I don't think that you can say that fairly across the board.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: On the contract research, Canada is in a
very unique position and has a leg up on its European allies because we
go back again to the special bilateral relationship. We say, "Don't worry
about us." If you are going to have sensitive procurement for sensitive
production of sensitive items, you should be treating us as Americans.
You should have the same exemption as is reflected in the general Export
Administration Regulations.
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: And they do.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: From time to time, under one or another
Department of Defense directive or other regulation, somebody forgets
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about the Canadian exemption. In that case, we think that they have
overstepped, and we do try to bring it back to conformity with the Cana-
dian exemption.
That reached the Head of Government level in 1985. The language
of the Quebec Security Declaration states that we are a North American
defense base. Canadians should have full participation, consistent with
the Canadian exemption, in defense development and defense production
sharing pursuant to the two sets of agreements to which I referred, but
am unable to discuss in detail in the interests of the more general issues.
We could spend an additional session on defense related items.
COMMENT, Mr. Bradley: I was not suggesting that the original
basis of the export control system was economic. I am saying that it has
increasingly moved in that direction.
COMMENT, Mr. Downey: I don't think so. I think Jon Fried's
point is right. We have aberrant behavior now and then in the procure-
ment area and the good folks in Ottawa straighten out Washington every
now and then. The beneficiary is Canada. I'd be all in favor of a
stronger control regime for technology transfers to Japan and elsewhere.
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